

ACCESSION #: 9810130299

NON-PUBLIC?: N

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME: Indian Point Nuclear Generating PAGE: 1 OF 4

Station, Unit No. 2

DOCKET NUMBER: 05000247

TITLE: INADVERTENT STATION BLACKOUT ACTUATION DURING TEST OF  
DIESEL GENERATORS.

EVENT DATE: 09/01/1998 LER #: 1998-013-00 REPORT DATE: 09/30/1998

OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED: DOCKET NO: 05000

OPERATING MODE: N POWER LEVEL: 000

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR  
SECTION:

50.73(a)(2)(iv)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER:

NAME: Ingvar G. Kjellberg, Sr. Engineer TELEPHONE: (914) 734-5567

COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIPTION:

CAUSE: SYSTEM: COMPONENT: MANUFACTURER:

REPORTABLE TO EPIX:

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED: NO

ABSTRACT: At 5:53 PM on September 1, 1998, with the unit in "Hot Standby", all control rods fully inserted and the reactor trip breakers open, the plant experienced an inadvertent station blackout. Emergency operating procedure "E-0", for reactor trip and safety injection, was entered. All safety related automatic actuations required by the station blackout signal performed as designed, including the auto start and loading of oil three emergency diesel generators (EDGs). After approximately 18 minutes transition to the Abnormal Operating Instruction 27.1.1 was performed for restoration of the 480 volt

buses to offsite power. As of 7:00 PM all 480V buses were restored to offsite power and the EDGs were returned to standby. The blackout signal was received when, during a post maintenance test of the 22 Emergency Diesel Generator, two (2) under voltage relays for offsite bus 5A were depressed to simulate a "black" start of the 22 diesel generator. Earlier that day, the generator lockout relays "86P" and "86BU" had changed from their "reset" position to their "tripped" position by performance of another test. The presence of unit trip signal simultaneously with actuation of two under-voltage relays from either bus 5A or bus 6A will initiate a blackout signal. Step 3.4.2 in Emergency Diesel Generator procedure PT-M21 states: "Verify that lockout relays 86P and 86BU are reset. If they are found in tripped condition, reset both relays. Record on data sheet." The failure to recheck this procedure step after a test interruption and a 5 hours delay resulted in the subsequent actuation of the blackout sequence.

TEXT PAGE 2 OF 4

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION:

Westinghouse 4-Loop Pressurized Water Reactor

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Inadvertent station blackout actuation during test of diesel generators.

EVENT DATE:

September 1, 1998

REPORT DUE DATE:

October 1, 1998

REFERENCES:

Condition Reporting System (CRS) : 199807587

PAST SIMILAR OCCURRENCE:

None

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

On September 1, 1998, Indian Point unit 2 was in "Hot Standby" with all

rods fully inserted and the reactor trip breakers open. The reactor

coolant system (RCS) temperature was 545 degrees F and the RCS pressure was

2235 PSIG. On the morning of September 1st the reactor protection system RPS logic train "B" functional test, PT-2M3, was in progress. While this test was in progress, the senior reactor operator (SRO) was given the emergency diesel generator test, PT-M21, for review. He performed a review of the precautions and limitations and checked off the initial steps including the reset mode of the generator lockout relays. Later, at approximately 1 PM, the RPS logic test, PT-2M3, was completed and the main generator lockout relays 86P and 86BU were left in their tripped mode. The SRO was notified of the "as left" condition of the generator lockout relays. Several hours later, when the diesel generator test PT-M21 commenced, the step to check if the generator trip relays were reset, was not rechecked or verified. At 1750 hours, two (2) of bus 5A's under voltage relays were depressed to simulate a "black" start of the 22 diesel generator. As the main generator lockout relays "86P" and "86BU" were in the tripped position, this resulted in an inadvertent station blackout actuation. Emergency Operating Procedure "E-0", for reactor trip and safety injection, was entered.

TEXT PAGE 3 OF 4

#### DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE (continued):

All safety related automatic actuations, required by the station blackout sequence, performed as designed, including the auto start and loading of all three emergency diesel generators (EDGs). After approximately 18 minutes the operator made a transition to a Abnormal Operating Instruction

(AOI) 27.1.1. AOI 27.1.1 is the procedure that is used to connect the 480 volt buses to offsite power, As of 7:00 PM all 480V buses were restored to offsite power and the EDGs were returned to standby.

#### ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

An inadvertent blackout signal was received at approximately 5:53 PM September 1, 1998. It occurred during performance of PT-M21, a load test of the Emergency Diesel Generators, when two (2) under voltage relays for bus 5A were depressed to simulate a "black" start of the 22 diesel generator. It was discovered that, earlier that day, the RPS logic train "B" functional test, PT-2M3 had changed the generator lockout relays "86P" and "86BU" from reset to their tripped position. The presence of generator trip signal simultaneously with actuation of two under-voltage relays from either bus 5A or bus 6A will initiate a blackout sequence.

Review of PT-M21 revealed that the procedure, if adhered to, was adequate, both with respect to procedure prerequisites and "step by step" instructions, to provide assurance that the test was properly performed, Procedure Step 3.4.2 in PT-M21 states: "Verify that lockout relays 86P and 86BU are reset. If they are found in tripped condition, reset both relays. Record on data sheet." Omission to recheck this step resulted in the subsequent actuation of the blackout sequence.

The SRO received test procedure PT-M21 in the morning. He reviewed the procedure the actual relay position and found that the 86P and 86BU relays to be in the "reset" position at that time. The prerequisites for the test

were satisfied before noon. However, PT-M21, scheduled to take place at this time, was then interrupted and delayed. At approximately 1 PM the SRO was notified, at the completion of the reactor protection logic train "B" functional test, PT-2M3, that this test left relays 86P and 86BU in their "tripped" position. Therefore, during the test delay of PT-M21, the initial conditions for the test had changed. The pre-job briefing, which is usually performed prior to the start of the test, was not performed prior to resuming the test. A pre-job briefing at this time could have determined that the generator lockout relay had changed from being reset to its tripped condition. Further, the steps in test procedure PT-M21 previously performed were not rechecked. The lockout relays remained in the tripped position, which in turn caused the blackout sequence to occur when the under voltage relays on bus 5A were depressed to simulate a "black" start of the 22 diesel generator.

TEXT PAGE 4 OF 4

#### CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

Although lack of procedure adherence was the direct cause of the incident, there were several causal factors that contributed to this event. A root cause evaluation was performed in accordance with a station administrative order, SAO-112, which identified factors contributing to the incident. Test interruption of PT-M21 was a main cause to this event, because during this delay, test prerequisites for PT-M21 were changed by test PT-2M3, which altered the previously verified relay line up. This relay lineup was

a prerequisite for the successful execution of test PT-M21. A pre-job briefing, which was performed for other jobs that day, was not done. If performed prior to commencing PT-M21, it would most likely have discovered the change of state of the generator lockout relay.

**CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:**

Corrective actions include:

1. Pre-job briefings are now required for all work outside the normal shift routine and shall occur in close proximity to the start of a job.
2. Guidance has been given to manage handling of interruptions and delays. If a procedure or test is delayed, completed procedure activities such as precautions, limitations and completed procedure steps will be verified again prior to resuming the procedure or test.

ATTACHMENT 1 TO 9810130299 PAGE 1 OF 2 ATTACHMENT 1 TO 9810130299  
PAGE 1 OF 2

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September 30, 1998

Re: Indian Point Unit No. 2

Docket No. 50-247

LER 98-013-00

Document Control Desk

US Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Mail Station P1-137

Washington, DC 20555-0001

The attached Licensee Event Report LER 98-013-00 is hereby submitted in  
accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73.

Very truly yours,

Attachment

ATTACHMENT 1 TO 9810130299 PAGE 2 OF 2

cc: Mr. Hubert J. Miller,

Regional Administrator-Region I

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